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Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edward C. Smith, former Manager of the Borough of 
Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, brought suit against the 
Borough alleging that it had failed to renew his employment 
contract on the basis of his age. At the close of the trial, the 
district court refused his request to instruct the jury that it 
could infer intentional discrimination if it disbelieved the 
Borough's asserted reasons for not renewing Smith's 
contract. Smith appeals from the judgment entered on the 
jury's adverse verdict, and seeks a new trial, claiming that 
the district court committed reversible error in omitting 
that instruction. 
 
I 
 
Smith was hired as Borough Manager on June 5, 1989, 
pursuant to a five-year employment contract. Under the 
contract, Smith's employment was to be renewed for an 
additional five years unless written notice was given by 
either party within thirty days before or after the contract's 
expiration. On March 23, 1994, a member of the Borough 
Council orally informed Smith, then 61 years old, that the 
Council would not be renewing his contract but that he was 
welcome to reapply for the job along with other applicants. 
Two weeks later, Smith, the Mayor and the Council 
President signed a resolution stating that the Borough 
would not be extending Smith's employment agreement and 
that it would begin interviewing other applicants for the 
position. 
 
Although Smith told several council members that he was 
interested in retaining his position, he did not formally 
submit an application. On February 15, 1995, Thomas 
Leach, who was 37 years old, was hired as the new 
Borough Manager. Only after Leach was hired did Smith 
apply in writing for the Borough Manager position. 
 
Smith brought suit against the Borough alleging that his 
employment contract had not been renewed on account of 
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his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. S 623 ("ADEA"). At trial, Smith 
produced evidence that the fiscal health of the Borough had 
improved markedly during his tenure. In defense of its 
action in failing to renew Smith's contract, the Borough 
elicited testimony from Council members that Smith's 
performance on the job had been inadequate. Smith then 
offered evidence that the Borough had not criticized Smith's 
performance at prior hearings before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Human Relations and in its 
responses to Smith's interrogatories. Instead, the Borough 
explained that it did not renew Smith's contract because 
Smith had not timely applied for the position.1 
 
At the court's request, the parties submitted written 
proposed jury instructions and objections to the court's 
proposed charge. Smith, citing our opinion in Sheridan v. 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 
1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997), 
requested that the court instruct the jury that it could infer 
intentional discrimination if it found the Borough's reasons 
for not renewing the contract to be false or not credible. 
Thereafter, at an in camera charge conference, Smith 
objected to the court's draft charge, noting that it did not 
include his requested instruction on pretext. The court 
denied Smith's request and overruled his objection, stating: 
"it is error for me to instruct on that. . . . for me to give a 
pretext instruction would be an error, simple as that." App. 
at 983. Smith did not renew his objection after the court 
delivered the charge to the jury. 
 
The jury returned a verdict for the Borough. Smith then 
filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that it was 
error for the district court not to have given the instructions 
he requested. The court denied the motion and this appeal 
followed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note, however, that in its answer to Smith's complaint, the 
Borough listed 18 different areas in which Smith's job performance was 
"not satisfactory." App. at 3-4. 
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II 
 
When reviewing the propriety of a district court's charge 
to the jury, the scope of our review depends on whether the 
party challenging the charge properly preserved his or her 
objection before the trial court. Where the objection is 
properly preserved, our inquiry is whether the charge, 
"taken as a whole, properly apprises the jury of the issues 
and the applicable law." Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers 
Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991) (en 
banc). Where the objection has been waived, however, our 
power to review is discretionary and "should be exercised 
sparingly." Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 
57 F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting McAdam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 770 n.31 (3d Cir. 
1990)). When we choose to exercise that discretion, we may 
reverse only where the error is "fundamental and highly 
prejudicial or if the instructions are such that the jury is 
without adequate guidance on a fundamental question and 
our failure to consider the error would result in a 
miscarriage of justice." Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1289 (quoting 
Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 
(3d Cir. 1989)). 
 
The Borough has not argued that Smith waived his 
objection to the district court's charge. However, because 
the waiver issue is central to determining the scope of our 
review, we will not simply assume that the objection was 
preserved, merely because the Borough failed to raise the 
waiver argument. 
 
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure 
to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Rule 51 plays a critical role 
in both the trial and appellate processes. By requiring 
parties to object with specificity before the jury retires, the 
rule ensures that the district court is made aware of and 
given an opportunity to correct any alleged error in the 
charge before the jury begins its deliberations. See, e.g., 
Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1288. When errors are recognized and 
corrected at that early stage, the burden on the courts of 
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appeals is diminished, fewer jury verdicts will have to be 
vacated and fewer cases will need to be tried a second time. 
See id. Unfortunately, though we have been consistent in 
articulating the patent purpose of Rule 51, we have not 
been as consistent in its application. 
 
In Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1985), 
we stated unequivocally that "[i]n this circuit it is clear that 
by filing and obtaining a ruling on a proposed instruction 
a litigant has satisfied Rule 51." Id. at 646. There, because 
counsel had obtained a definitive ruling rejecting his 
proposed instruction, we held that the issue had been 
preserved regardless of counsel's failure to reassert his 
objection following the delivery of the charge to the jury. 
That result was based on our belief that Rule 51 must be 
read in conjunction with Rule 46, which gives litigants an 
automatic exception to any adverse ruling by operation of 
law.2 We concluded that given"the relationship between 
Rule 51 and Rule 46, [ ] counsel was entitled to assume 
that he need not renew objections already ruled on." Id. at 
647. See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 226 
F.2d 745, 750 (3d Cir. 1955) (discussing the relationship 
between Rule 51 and Rule 46). 
 
In case after case, we have held that a definitive ruling 
from the trial court rejecting a requested instruction is 
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See Tait v. Armor 
Elevator Co., 958 F.2d 563, 565 (3d Cir. 1992); Simmons v. 
City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 
1991); Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 731 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1990); cf. United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 179 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1998) ("issue preserved for appeal where the party 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rule 46 provides in full: 
 
        Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are 
       unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an exception has 
       heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the 
time the 
       ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the 
       court the action which the party desires the court to take or the 
       party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds 
therefor; 
       and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order 
at 
       the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not 
thereafter 
       prejudice the party. 
 
                                5 
  
`may not have formally objected but it is clear from the 
record that the judge was made aware of the party's 
position before the jury retired to consider its verdict' ") 
(quoting Larry v. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. and 
Const. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 425 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
See also 9 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice S 51.03 (3d ed. 1997) ("Reconciliation of the rules 
[51 and 46] relieves a party of the need to renew an 
objection to an instruction if the party's objection has 
previously been made clear to the trial court."). 
 
Three of our cases appear to deviate from this 
interpretation. In United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 301 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1985), a case interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, 
the criminal analogue to Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, we held that 
notwithstanding prior objections and rulings, the failure of 
counsel to state objections to the instructions following the 
delivery of the charge constitutes a waiver. We reasoned 
that Agnes was distinguishable from Bowley because the 
district court in Agnes had not granted an automatic 
exception, which we inferred the district court had done in 
Bowley. However, the statement by the district court in 
Bowley that counsel had "an automatic exception to every 
adverse ruling" was merely a recognition of the interplay 
between Rule 51 and Rule 46. Bowley, 751 F.2d at 641. 
The "automatic exception" arose by operation of law -- not 
because the district court had affirmatively granted one. 
 
The Agnes court also cited Piechoski v. Grace Lines, Inc., 
409 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1969), for the proposition that"Rule 
51 requires counsel to state explicitly any exceptions 
following delivery of the charge." Agnes, 753 F.2d at 301 
n.11. In fact, the Piechoski court simply stated that 
"[c]ounsel is entitled to an opportunity to make objections to 
the charge following its delivery" and, because counsel was 
given that opportunity and never objected to the charge at 
issue, the objection was deemed waived. Piechoski, 409 
F.2d at 70 (emphasis added). Piechoski is thus slim 
authority for Agnes. 
 
The second case in this line is Seman v. Coplay Cement 
Co., 26 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1994), where we stated in dictum 
that "As written, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 
explicitly requires that any objections to the court's charge, 
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to be preserved for appeal, must be taken at the close of the 
charge `before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection.' " Id. at 436 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 51). The underscored portion of this quote is simply 
wrong. Rule 51 "as written" requires merely that the 
specific objection be made "before the jury retires." It says 
nothing about it being at the close of the charge. Tellingly, 
the only cases that the Seman panel relied upon for this 
proposition were Agnes and Bowley -- as that case was 
misinterpreted in Agnes. In any event, the Seman court 
held that the objection had not been waived because the 
district court had informed counsel that it would not have 
to reassert objections after the delivery of the charge if the 
court had previously ruled. Id. 
 
Third, and most recently, we stated in Ryder v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1052 (1998), that "[w]e have interpreted 
[Rule 51] explicitly to require that any objections to the jury 
charge be made at the close of the charge." Id. at 135. For 
that proposition, the court cited only Seman. Id. The 
statement was essentially dictum, however, since the 
defendant had not, at any time, adequately objected to the 
specific instruction on appeal. Ryder, 128 F.3d at 135 n.9. 
 
Given the purpose underlying Rule 51, it is difficult to 
contemplate what objective would be served by requiring 
counsel to restate an objection that had already been raised 
and ruled upon. In our opinion, Agnes and the cases 
following it have gone astray and do not reflect the 
otherwise consistently applied law of this circuit. We 
reaffirm then, that "[i]n this circuit it is clear that by filing 
and obtaining a ruling on a proposed instruction a litigant 
has satisfied Rule 51." Bowley, 751 F.2d at 646. 
 
Of course, to preserve an issue for appeal, counsel must 
state "distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of 
the objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Whether that occurs in an 
objection to the charge, in a request to charge, or 
otherwise, however, should not be determinative of the 
waiver issue. See 9A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure S 2553 at 411 (2d ed. 
1995) ("The failure to object [at the close of the charge] may 
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be disregarded if the party's position previously has been 
made clear to the trial judge and it is plain that a further 
objection would be unavailing. This is a risky business, 
however, and cautious counsel will renew all objections to 
the instructions at the close of the charge to be sure that 
those points are preserved.") (citing cases). 
 
Here, Smith submitted to the district court a written 
proposed instruction distinctly stating his requested charge 
and the authority therefor. Upon reading the draft of the 
district court's charge, counsel objected at the in camera 
charge conference to the omission of his requested 
instruction and again cited the authority on which his 
instruction was derived. The district court then ruled and 
explicitly denied Smith's request. As such, the district court 
was fully apprised of Smith's position, and it would serve 
no purpose to require counsel to have formally reasserted 
the objection after the charge had been given to the jury. 
Because the language of Rule 51 requires nothing more, we 
conclude that the issue was preserved. We turn then to the 
merits of Smith's appeal. 
 
III 
 
It is black letter law that "[i]t is the inescapable duty of 
the trial judge to instruct the jurors, fully and correctly, on 
the applicable law of the case, and to guide, direct, and 
assist them toward an intelligent understanding of the legal 
and factual issues involved in their search for the truth." 
9A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure S 2556 at 438 (2d ed. 1995). We agree with 
Smith that the district court's charge left the jury 
inadequately informed of the applicable law. 
 
In the field of employment discrimination, courts have 
struggled for decades to develop and refine an evidentiary 
framework that fairly balances the interests of the employee 
who challenges her employer's conduct as discriminatory 
and the interests of the employer faced with such a suit. In 
numerous cases the courts have recognized that an 
employee bringing such a suit faces difficulties in amassing 
proof because discrimination "is often subtle." Chipollini v. 
Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (en 
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banc). As we stated, "[d]iscrimination victims often come to 
the legal process without witnesses and with little direct 
evidence indicating the precise nature of the wrongs they 
have suffered." Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1071 (quoting 
Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 236 (3d 
Cir. 1987)). 
 
In order "to assure that the plaintiff has his day in court 
despite the unavailability of direct evidence," Trans World 
Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quotation 
omitted), courts developed "a sensible, orderly way to 
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it 
bears on the critical question of discrimination." United 
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 
711, 715 (1983) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). What was developed, of course, 
was the now-familiar burden shifting framework first 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).3  
 
If the plaintiff establishes the elements of a prima facie 
case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reason for its employment decision. Once 
such a justification is proffered, the burden then reverts to 
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the articulated reason is a pretext. At all times, the 
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that 
discrimination (here age) was a determinative factor in the 
adverse employment decision. See generally St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The plaintiff "may 
succeed in this either directly by persuading the[fact 
finder] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 
When a jury finds that the employer's proffered justification 
for its actions is pretextual, the jury is permitted, albeit not 
mandated, to return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. See 
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although McDonnell Douglas arose under Title VII, we have 
consistently applied its general framework to cases arising under other 
discrimination statutes including the ADEA. See Keller v. Orix Credit 
Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
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The rationale for placing so much emphasis on the 
justification proffered by the employer can be found in the 
statement made by Chief Justice, then Justice, Rehnquist 
who wrote that unexplained acts "are more likely than not 
based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 577. He continued, "when 
all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been 
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it 
is more likely than not the employer, who we generally 
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on 
an impermissible consideration such as race." Id. 
 
Because "an employer who knowingly discriminates . . . 
may leave no written records revealing the forbidden motive 
and may communicate it orally to no one," Chipollini, 814 
F.2d at 899 (quotation omitted), it is only natural that the 
focus of a discrimination trial in accordance with McDonnell 
Douglas will be the veracity of the justification offered by 
the employer to explain its conduct. If the employer fails to 
tell the truth, "it does so at its own peril . . . . [and] the jury 
[may] infer that the real motivation is the one that the 
plaintiff has charged." Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1069. 
 
The jury charge played a central role in our holding in 
Sheridan that a finding of pretext was a permissible basis 
for a verdict of discrimination. We stated: "[i]t is the jury's 
determination that the reason given was pretextual together 
with the evidence that supported the prima facie case that 
will sustain a finding of intentional discrimination made 
after a proper charge." Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1071 
(emphasis added). 
 
Notwithstanding the pivotal role played by pretext in the 
ultimate decision of discrimination vel non, the district 
court in the case at bar refused to inform the jurors of that 
role. At the heart of the district court's charge, the court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
 
       [T]he dispositive fact that you must decide is whether 
       Mr. Smith has proven by a preponderance of the 
       evidence that his age was a determining factor in the 
       borough's decision not to renew his employment 
       contract. He need not prove that his age was the sole 
       or exclusive reason for the borough's decision not to 
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       renew the contract. Age is a determining factor, 
       however, if Mr. Smith's contract would have been 
       renewed except for his age. 
 
App. at 1053. The court repeatedly emphasized that the 
jury's task was to determine whether Smith's age was a 
determinative factor in the Borough's decision not to renew 
his employment contract. App. at 1054-55, 1058. 
 
Although we acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit has 
signified its approval of an instruction similar to that given 
here, see, e.g., Achor v. Riverside Golf Club, 117 F.3d 339 
(7th Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit has expressly required 
more. It stated: 
 
        If the defendant has met its burden of producing 
       evidence that, if taken as true, would rebut the prima 
       facie case, a threshold matter to be decided by the 
       judge, the jury need not be told anything about a 
       defendant's burden of production. In that event, 
       whether or not the facts of the plaintiff 's prima facie 
       case are disputed, the jury needs to be told two things: 
       (1) it is the plaintiff 's burden to persuade the jurors by 
       a preponderance of the evidence that the apartment (or 
       job) was denied because of race (or, in other cases, 
       because of some other legally invalid reason), and (2) 
       the jury is entitled to infer, but need not infer, that this 
       burden has been met if they find that the [facts needed 
       to make a prima facie case] have been established and 
       they disbelieve the defendant's explanation. 
 
Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 
This court has not yet addressed this precise issue. 
However, we have steadfastly adhered to the principle that 
the "objective of the charge is to clarify the issues in the 
light of the evidence `to provide aid and guidance for the 
jury.' " Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 1961) 
(quotation omitted). The trial court must ensure"that the 
jury be given full and complete instructions by relating the 
law to the relevant evidence in the case." Choy v. Bouchelle, 
436 F.2d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 1970). We have considered this 
such an important function that we have reversed jury 
verdicts because the trial court failed to provide the 
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requisite legal guidelines even when the party failed to 
preserve an objection. Id.; Richardson v. Walsh Constr. Co., 
334 F.2d 334, 338 (3d Cir. 1963); Atkinson, 297 F.2d at 
575; McNello v. John B. Kelly, Inc., 283 F.2d 96, 102 (3d 
Cir. 1960). 
 
Applying these principles, it is clear that the jury must be 
given the legal context in which it is to find and apply the 
facts. It is difficult to understand what end is served by 
reversing the grant of summary judgment for the employer 
on the ground that the jury is entitled to infer 
discrimination from pretext, as we instructed in Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994), if the jurors 
are never informed that they may do so. Accordingly, we 
join the Second Circuit in holding that the jurors must be 
instructed that they are entitled to infer, but need not, that 
the plaintiff 's ultimate burden of demonstrating intentional 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence can be 
met if they find that the facts needed to make up the prima 
facie case have been established and they disbelieve the 
employer's explanation for its decision.4  
 
The Borough contends that, even without Smith's 
requested instruction, the court's charge read as a whole 
adequately informed the jury what it was permitted to do if 
it disbelieved the Borough's proffered justification for its 
decision. The first portion of the charge to which the 
Borough points instructed the jury that it could discredit a 
witness's testimony if it found inconsistencies or 
discrepancies therein. This, however, merely instructed the 
jurors as to when they may disbelieve a witness. It said 
nothing about what the jury may do or infer once the jurors 
had decided to disbelieve the employer's proffered reason. 
 
The second instruction that could be read to support the 
Borough's position informed the jury that it could consider 
direct or circumstantial evidence and provided examples, 
including a departure from the employer's standard 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This does not mean that the instruction should include the technical 
aspects of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting, a charge reviewed as 
unduly confusing and irrelevant for a jury. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 
F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979); Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., 903 
F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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practices, suspect decision making methods, a history of 
discrimination, a hostile work environment or statistical 
proof of discrimination. This instruction is inadequate for 
those employees who have little or no circumstantial 
evidence of the type alluded to by the district court, the 
very plaintiffs for whom the McDonnell Douglas framework 
was developed. Under this instruction, the jurors who 
found no evidence fitting the examples of circumstantial 
evidence referred to in the charge but who disbelieved the 
employer's explanation could reasonably conclude that 
there was no evidence on which they would be permitted to 
base a plaintiff 's verdict. This conclusion would, of course, 
be incorrect as a matter of law but would be 
understandable in light of the instruction. 
 
Third, the district court instructed the jury that it could 
make inferences based on common experiences and 
common sense. Although the inference of discrimination 
arising from pretext is grounded in the common sense 
notion that any party's false testimony may be taken as 
evidence of its having fabricated its case, Sheridan, 100 
F.3d at 1069, this does not mean that the jury will know 
without being told that its disbelief in the employer's 
proffered reason may be evidence that, coupled with 
evidence establishing plaintiff's prima facie case, will 
support a finding of intentional discrimination. While it 
may appear to us, looking from the perspective of our 
knowledge of the reported opinions, that the evidentiary 
framework that evolved is nothing more than common 
sense, the jury comes to its task without that background 
or history. If the district courts are not required to instruct 
the jurors that they may use the evidence that supported 
plaintiff 's prima facie case coupled with their rejection of 
the reasons offered by the employer for the employment 
decision to conclude that the employer intentionally 
discriminated, then all our carefully honed language will 
have been an exercise in irrelevance. 
 
In light of the decades it has taken for the courts to 
shape and refine the McDonnell Douglas standard into its 
present form and the inordinate amount of ink that has 
been spilled over the question of how a jury may use its 
finding of pretext, it would be disingenuous to argue that it 
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is nothing more than a matter of common sense. Indeed, 
the answer to the question of whether a jury is allowed to 
infer discrimination from pretext eluded many of the federal 
courts of this country for a substantial period of time. As 
we stated in Atkinson, "If it is to be assumed that jurors 
have ordinary intelligence, it may not be assumed that they 
are students of the law. The task of the jury, to apply the 
rules of law as given by the court below, certainly cannot be 
satisfactorily accomplished . . . in the abstract." 297 F.2d 
at 574 (overturning the verdict because, inter alia, the trial 
court failed to include in its charge the rather obvious 
direction that negligence cannot be imputed to the 
passengers). 
 
Without a charge on pretext, the course of the jury's 
deliberations will depend on whether the jurors are smart 
enough or intuitive enough to realize that inferences of 
discrimination may be drawn from the evidence 
establishing plaintiff's prima facie case and the pretextual 
nature of the employer's proffered reasons for its actions. It 
does not denigrate the intelligence of our jurors to suggest 
that they need some instruction in the permissibility of 
drawing that inference. 
 
Former Chief Judge Biggs of this court has explained 
that the rule that the district court must give a requested 
instruction in accordance with a party's contention and 
consistent with the evidence unless the subject matter has 
been covered adequately elsewhere in the charge, see 
generally Wright & Miller S 2556 at 444, is based on the 
unacceptability of leaving "entirely to the jury the task of 
particularizing the legal standard and working out the 
alternatives possible under the facts." See McNello, 283 
F.2d at 102. That was the task the court's instruction left 
the jury, although there was evidence that the Borough's 
explanation for its action varied. It had advised the EEOC 
and the Pennsylvania Commission on Human Relations 
that it didn't renew Smith's employment contract because 
he failed to file a formal application, in contrast to its 
explanation at trial which emphasized Smith's poor job 
performance. While this variation in articulated reasons did 
not compel the jury to disbelieve the Borough, the 
inconsistency was sufficient for a reasonable jury to view it 
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as evidence of pretext leading to an inference of 
discrimination if the jury had been adequately charged. 
 
We do not intend for today's holding to suggest that 
Smith has presented a particularly strong case or that the 
jury necessarily would have found it persuasive even with 
a proper instruction. Nevertheless, the rule we announce 
today will be equally applicable in future discrimination 
cases and, thus, it is with an eye to the future that we 
must fashion a rule in the context of the facts of this case. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury that it was permitted but not 
required to infer intentional discrimination if it found that 
Smith had proven the elements of his prima facie case and 
if it disbelieved the Borough's explanation for not having 
renewed Smith's contract. 
 
IV 
 
Based on the foregoing, we will vacate the jury's verdict 
for the Borough and remand the case to the district court 
for a new trial. 
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